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HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW:  CONTEMPORARY 
JURISTIC AND RABBINIC CONCEPTIONS 
DAVID WERMUTH* 
1. INTRODUCTION:  HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISRAEL 
Many have critiqued and condemned the State of Israel for 
alleged human rights violations.1  The upsurge of violence over the 
past few years between Israel and terrorist organizations in Gaza 
and Lebanon have evoked vitriolic condemnation of Israel‘s 
actions in defense of its security and its citizens.2  The human 
rights allegations lodged against Israel have led some to question 
whether the Jewish character of the state affects this alleged neglect 
of human rights to the Arab population in and surrounding Israel.3 
Jewish law—as part of the Jewish character embodied by the 
State of Israel—plays a crucial role in understanding the concept of 
human rights as developed by Jewish communities throughout 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2011. 
1 E.g., Human Rights Council Res. S-12/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/HRC/S-12/1 
(Oct. 21, 2009) (condemning Israel‘s actions to limit Palestinians‘ access to their 
properties and holy sites, particularly in Occupied East Jerusalem). 
2 See, e.g., Middle East Human Rights Groups Call on the General Assembly to 
Adopt the Goldstone Report, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 3, 2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11/03/middle-east-human-rights-groups-
call-general-assembly-adopt-goldstone-report (praising the Goldstone report for 
calling on Israeli and Palestinian armed forces to investigate human rights and 
war violations); see Fred Abrahams, On Israel, Congress Tolerates Abuse, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11 
/04/israel-congress-tolerates-abuse (criticizing the House of Representatives‘ vote 
condemning the Goldstone report).  See also Justice Richard Goldstone, Statement 
on behalf of the Members of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict, Address before the U.N. Human Rights Council 12th Session (Sept. 29, 
2009) (discussing the investigation of human rights violations in the Gaza Conflict 
and condemning some of Israel‘s conduct in this conflict); Human Rights Council 
Res. S-9/L. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/HRC/S-9/L.1 (Jan. 12, 2009) (condemning 
Israel‘s military operation in occupied Palestinian territory). 
3 See generally Ruth Gavison, The Jews‟ Right To Statehood: A Defense, 15 AZURE 
70 (2003) (arguing that Israel‘s long-term viability relies on a clear rationale for a 
Jewish state). 
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Jewish history, and as understood by some Jews in Israel today.  
Most of Jewish law developed while Jews were a minority, 
dispersed among mainly intolerant and belligerent Gentile 
majorities.  The jurisprudence of human rights laws and values 
during these periods reflects this situation.  However, for the first 
time in over eighteen centuries, the modern State of Israel creates a 
striking contrast to the past epochs of Jewish history, by 
establishing Jewish sovereignty and a Gentile minority under 
Jewish authority.  This drastic change in Jewish existence forced 
Jewish law scholars to confront the gaps in Jewish human rights 
laws as they pertain to Gentiles.  Rabbis, Jewish law scholars 
internal to the Jewish law tradition, and members of the Israeli 
Judiciary offer different jurisprudential methods for reconciling 
modern human rights laws and values with the corpora of Jewish 
law.  The divergences and convergences of human rights 
jurisprudence between (1) how the concept of human rights 
developed in Jewish law before statehood, and (2) how several 
modern Jewish law thinkers approach human rights in Jewish law, 
along with (3) how those compare to the methods used by the 
Israeli Supreme Court when it incorporates Jewish law into its 
discussions on human rights, demonstrate how Jewish law—as 
part of the Jewish nature of the State of Israel—does not per se 
contribute to the human rights problems facing Israel today. 
2. THE INFLUENCE OF JEWISH LAW IN ISRAEL TODAY 
Jewish law assumes an uncertain place in the Israeli legal 
system.  Scholars disagree as to Jewish law‘s legal weight in the 
Israeli judicial system.  Some claim that Jewish law in the Israeli 
court system functions merely as ―a decoration and not as serious 
source of substantive law.‖4  Others have argued that Jewish law 
plays a substantive and crucial role in the interpretation of value-
laden terms, such as equity, public policy, and good faith, and at 
times serves as the sole basis for a particular Supreme Court 
decision.5  Regardless, the Israeli Supreme Court has stated that it 
will employ Jewish law only insofar as it does not conflict with 
 
4 M. Bass & D. Cheshin, Jewish Law in the Judgments of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Israel, 1 JEWISH L. ANN. 200, 212 (1978). 
5 See 4 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 1730 
(Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994) (―[I]n not a few cases [Jewish 
law] has served as the principal source for the Supreme Court‘s decision.‖). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/3
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secular law.6  Due to the fact that only a few Supreme Court 
justices received training in Jewish law, decisions incorporating 
Jewish law account for a relatively minor proportion of Israeli 
Supreme Court decisions. 
However, while Jewish law may not carry much weight in the 
Israeli legal system, it has great importance for the religious Jewish 
community in Israel.  For religious Jews, Jewish law discusses and 
designates the proper course of action for Jews in all areas of life.  
Those who believe in Jewish law‘s divine approbation follow its 
mandates out of religious obligation, even though no formal 
authoritative religious court charged with enforcing its rulings 
exists.  Many religious Jews believe that once the Messiah comes 
and brings redemption to the world, Jewish law will once again 
serve as the law for the Jewish State of Israel. 
In Israel today, most religious Zionists relate to the state of 
Israel on religious terms.  The influential and at times extreme 
messianic religious Zionists, greatly affected by the teachings of 
Rabbi Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook, believe that the Jewish return to 
Israel marks the beginning of the Redemption and the coming of 
the Messiah.7  Realizing the Redemption will bring about the telos 
for which Jews have waited since the destruction of the Second 
Temple in 70 C.E.  Nevertheless, the fact that they believe they are 
living in the beginning of the redemptive period affects the way 
they relate to Jewish law as it pertains to the land of Israel.  For 
Messianists, these religious laws trump secular laws whenever the 
observance of secular laws might hinder the realization of the 
Redemption.  The Israeli population experienced this when Israel 
dismantled and relocated the population of several Israeli towns 
located in the Gaza Strip in 2005.  At the time, many rabbis claimed 
that removing Jews from Israel violated Jewish law, and many 
religious soldiers refused orders to remove Israelis from their 
 
6 Cf. HCJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. State of Israel 34(1) IsrSC 1, 17 [1980], translated 
in ITZHAK ZAMIR & ALLEN ZYSBLAT, PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 383 (1996) (stating that 
Israel is ―a state where the Halakha (religious law) is applied only in so far as 
secular law allows it‖).  
7 See generally AVIEZER RAVITZKY, MESSIANISM, ZIONISM, AND JEWISH RELIGIOUS 
RADICALISM 79–144 (Michael Swirsky & Jonathan Chipman trans., 1996) (offering a 
detailed theological overview of the teachings and beliefs of messianic religious 
Zionism). 
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homes in Gaza.8  The pullout from Gaza caused extreme social 
unrest and widened the gap between the messianic religious 
community and the rest of Israel‘s population.9  While Jewish law 
may not have significant influence in the secular Israeli court 
system, it may still have profound legal reach.  The conclusions 
that modern rabbis reach when relying on Jewish law as their 
authority have the power to convince faithful messianic religious 
Zionists to go so far as to break secular law if the alternative 
somehow stands in the way of realizing the destiny of the Jewish 
people in Israel. 
3. HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW OF EARLIER PERIODS 
3.1. Biblical Law 
Biblical law provides both universal and national guidelines.  
In many instances, the Bible explicitly states to whom certain laws 
apply.  In Deuteronomy chapter 15, the Bible details a social 
welfare program that dissolves debts every seven years for citizens 
 
8 For an interesting discussion of rabbi-led protests to prevent soldiers from 
removing Jews from their homes in Gaza, see Dan Izenberg, Yesha Rabbis Preach 




tzva+of+stopping+pullout.  Perhaps as a result of the protests, an unknown 
number of soldiers during this time refused to follow these orders requiring 
disengagement.  See also Yaakov Katz, Rabbis Say No to Violence, Yes to Breaking the 




desc=Rabbis+say+no+to+violence,+yes+to+breaking+the+law (quoting rabbis as 
saying that contributing to the evacuation of settlements for non-Jews violates the 
Torah and is immoral); Margot Dudkevitch, IDF: Few Will Refuse Pullout Orders, 




ut+orders (stating that the army did not expect many soldiers to refuse orders to 
participate in the disengagement). 
9 See Dina Kraft, Defiant Young People Vow to Resist the Gaza Pullout, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at A8 (contrasting the calls for peaceful protests issued by 
prominent members of the Israeli religious community with violent, civilian-led 
protests and riots following the decision by Israel‘s government to withdraw from 
the Gaza Strip). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/3
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but not for foreigners.10  In chapter 23 of the same book, the Bible 
explicitly prohibits collecting interest from citizens, while expressly 
permitting usury vis-à-vis foreigners.11  Likewise, in Genesis 
chapter 9, the Bible records that the murder of any human being 
shall be punishable by death, for God has created humanity in 
God‘s own image.12  In Leviticus chapter 24, the Bible offers one 
manner of law pertaining to all human beings regarding 
compensatory damages when one person maims another person.13 
However, the bulk of Biblical law does not carry with it an 
explicit audience.  When silent, whom does the law intend to 
protect?  For example: 
Thou shalt not murder.  Thou shalt not commit adultery.  
Thou shalt not steal.  Thou shalt not bear false witness 
against thy neighbor.  Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor‘s 
house; thou shalt not covet thy neighbor‘s wife, nor his 
man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, 
nor any thing that is thy neighbor‘s.14 
Who shall one not murder?  With whose spouse shall one not lie?  
From whom shall one not steal?  These latent ambiguities might 
seem easily answerable to the modern reader—they obviously 
apply universally.  When understood universally, these laws from 
the Decalogue—the inviolability of life, family, and property—
make up the bedrock of human rights in the ancient world. 
Yet, most ancient Jewish legal scholars did not interpret the law 
in this way.  For them, such passages only refer to Jewish victims.  
This dialectic—the allegiance to legal precedent and the imperative 
of modern mores—poses a great challenge for contemporary 
Jewish legal scholars.  The modern Jewish legal scholar‘s 
interpretation of the scope of such laws will depend in part on the 
 
10 See Deuteronomy 15:2–3 (Jewish Publication Society of America) (―[E]very 
creditor shall remit the due that he claims from his neighbor; he shall not dun his 
neighbor or kinsman . . . .  You may dun the foreigner; but you must remit 
whatever is due you from your kinsmen.‖). 
11 See Deuteronomy 23:20–21 (Jewish Publication Society of America) (―You 
shall not deduct interest from loans to your countryman . . . .  You may deduct 
interest from loans to foreigners.‖). 
12 See Genesis 9:6 (Jewish Publication Society of America) (decrying the 
murder of human beings, ―[f]or in the image of God/Was man created‖).  
13 Leviticus 24:17–22 (Jewish Publication Society of America). 
14 Exodus 20:13–14 (Jewish Publication Society of America). 
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balance he strikes between strict loyalty to prior interpretations 
and modern moral sensibilities. 
3.2. Rabbinic Law 
The Rabbinic period in Judaism began immediately following 
the destruction of the second temple in Jerusalem in 70 C.E.15  In 
this period, the oral legal traditions of Judaism were found in 
written form in the Mishnah and several other works by Jewish 
legal scholars called Tannaim.16  Study of these works—especially 
of the Mishnah—by the Amoraim led to the codification of the 
Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds, the authoritative 
commentaries on the Mishnah.17  These legal texts from the 
Tannaitic and Amoraic eras in the Rabbinic period comprise the 
ancient corpus of Jewish law. 
Rabbinic exegesis of Biblical law preferred parochial and self-
interested interpretations.  In Exodus 21:14 the Bible elaborates on 
the prohibition of murder:  ―[a]nd if a man come presumptuously 
upon his neighbor, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from 
Mine altar, that he may die.‖18  The Mekhilta, a Tannaitic work, 
interprets this verse as follows:  by referring to the murderer as the 
generic ―man,‖ the Bible intends to make the scope of the 
command universal.19  Thus, any murderer shall be punished with 
death.  However, by referring to the victim with the closer relation, 
―neighbor,‖ the Bible intends that murder only be punishable by 
 
15 See Jacob Neusner, “Pharisaic-Rabbinic” Judaism: A Clarification, 12 HIST. 
RELIGIONS 250, 250 (1973) (―[T]he rabbinic Heilsgeschichte . . . regards the rabbis 
known after the destruction of the Second Temple in A.D. 70 as the heirs and 
continuators of the Pharisees of the period before that time.‖). 
16 See LAWRENCE H. SCHIFFMAN, FROM TEXT TO TRADITION: A HISTORY OF 
SECOND TEMPLE & RABBINIC JUDAISM 177 (1991) (stating that in the Rabbinic period, 
Mishnah was compiled and the oral Torah evolved into a fixed corpus which 
replaced the written Torah as ―the main object of Jewish study‖). 
17 See id. (arguing that the collection and editing of the Mishnah allowed 
Rabbinic Judaism to expand to virtually all of the world‘s Jews).  Cf. Neusner, 
supra note 15, at 250 (―The oral Torah was seen to constitute a single, continuous 
tradition, and its history would produce ‗Pharisaic-rabbinic‘ as readily as ‗Biblical-
talmudic‘ Judaism.‖). 
18 Exodus 21:14 (Jewish Publication Society), available at http://www.israel-
bar-mitzvah.com/torah/exo021.htm#014).  
19 See MEKHILTA D‘RABBI YISHMA‘EL, TRACTATE NEZIKIN, SECTION 4 (limiting 
the scope of murder to the Jewish victims). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/3
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death if the murderer kills a Jew.20  The passage ends with a very 
cryptic line by the Tanna,21 Isi Ben Akiva, who posits: 
Before the giving of the Bible, we were warned concerning 
the spilling of blood.  After the giving of the Bible, by [the 
laws] being made stricter, they were also made more 
lenient.  In truth [the rabbis] said that [regarding one who 
kills a Gentile] although exempt from temporal courts, his 
judgment is handed over to heaven.22  
 The full extent of the prohibition against murder and its legal 
repercussions—the axiomatic prohibition in human rights—does 
not pertain to Gentiles, according to the Rabbinic legal tradition. 
Although Jewish law formalistically denied Gentiles this basic 
human rights protection, it provided two other legal mechanisms 
to protect the rights of Gentiles.  The first approach—which still 
leaves much to be desired by modern standards—minimally 
protects the rights of Gentiles for the sake of avoiding hostility and 
reciprocal animosity.  Thus, while a Jew must assist the burdened 
animal of another Jew because of a Biblical command,23 he should 
help the burdened animal of a Gentile only in order to avoid 
inviting hostility from the Gentile population.24  Similarly, a female 
Jew may act as a nursemaid for a Gentile baby for a wage only to 
avoid engendering animosity.25  She may also deliver a Gentile 
baby for a wage to avoid hostility.26  Lastly, a Jew who sees a 
Gentile in a life-threatening situation should not save him unless 
 
20 Id. 
21 Tanna is the singular form of Tannaim. 
22 MEKHILTA D‘RABBI YISHMA‘EL, TRACTATE NEZIKIN, SECTION 4. 
23 See Exodus 23:5 (requiring Jews to assist the overburdened pack animals of 
others). 
24 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE BAVA METZIA 32b (commanding Jews to 
―tend to the animal of an idolater because of the need to prevent enmity‖). 
25 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE AVODAH ZARAH 26a (stating that it 
must be for a wage because the supposed hostility grows from the disparity that 
Jewish women will nurse Jewish babies for money, but not those of Gentiles).  
Conversely, the Talmud here records another legal scholar‘s opinion that 
prohibits nursing for a wage, rejecting the hostility argument.  Id.  
26 Id.  Another opinion in the Talmud prohibits Jewish midwifes from 
assisting in the birth of a Gentile child on the Sabbath—even though she may 
deliver a Jewish baby on that day—again rejecting the hostility argument. 
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inaction would engender hostility.27  This legal principle moves 
practice, albeit slightly, towards universal treatment in certain 
human rights areas, such as childbirth, childcare, and burdened 
animals, but does not otherwise afford much protection to 
Gentiles. 
The second principle, ―for the ways of peace,‖ enjoys greater 
development in ancient Jewish law and garners more sympathy 
from the modern reader.  In part, this principle provides the 
rationale for rabbinic legislation otherwise not included by formal 
exegetical methods.28  Thus, while the law requires competence to 
effectuate possession, the equitable principle, for the ways of 
peace, protects the possessions of the insane.29  While the fruit of 
trees growing in a private yard belongs to the owner of the land, 
any fruit that falls from that tree into the public domain has no 
owner.  Nevertheless, for the ways of peace, a person may not 
shake that tree to cause the fruit to fall into the public domain.30  
Using this equitable principle, the Tannaim expanded the scope of 
laws that facilitate an orderly society. 
In this context, the principle for the ways of peace extends 
certain legal protections to Gentiles.  Economically, the Tannaim 
included Gentiles within the scope of Jewish charity law; Jewish 
farmers should allow poor Gentiles to benefit from the biblically 
mandated social welfare programs afforded to the Jewish poor.31  
In cities inhabited by Jews and Gentiles, the community charity 
coffer should collect from and distribute to both groups.32  During 
the sabbatical year—during which Jews may not engage in 
 
27 Id.  Even though this law demonstrates apathy towards the lives of 
Gentiles, in practice, it will cause Jews to save Gentile lives. 
28 In broad strokes, this distinction parallels the law and equity distinction 
from medieval Europe. 
29 See MISHNA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 5:8 (asserting that the taking of the 
found possession of an insane individual is in fact a form of theft). 
30 See id. (stating that, equitably, the act of causing private fruit to fall into the 
public domain and then taking it is considered theft). 
31 See id. (restricting Jews from preventing ―the poor among the non-Jews 
from gathering gleanings‖ and other benefits from social welfare programs 
extended to poor Jews).  
32 See TOSEFTA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 3:13 (requiring charity for Jew and 
Gentile alike). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/3
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agricultural activity—a Jew may assist a Gentile‘s agricultural 
production (barring physical work on the land).33 
Socially, the Tannaim included laws pertaining to universal 
features of humanity, sickness, and death.  Just as a Jew has a 
positive commandment to visit ailing Jews, he must also visit sick 
Gentiles.34  And in the event of a death, a Jew must impartially 
ensure burial of the deceased (within the same cemetery if need 
be), eulogize the departed, and console the mourners of the 
deceased irrespective of the deceased‘s religious or national 
affiliation.35  Finally, as a basic staple of human decency and 
respect, a Jew must give salutations to Gentiles.36  To ensure the 
observance of these basic needs—the need for food, the need for 
dignity while ill and approaching death, and the need for basic 
human respect and recognition—Jewish law created the equitable 
principle for the ways of peace. 
Following Biblical times, the Rabbinic period saw a narrowing 
of human equality in Jewish law.  Although the rabbis constrained 
the default scope of Biblical law to members of the Jewish religion, 
they were not devoid of sympathy for Gentiles; the rabbis 
generated two legal mechanisms for affording equal protection for 
certain basic human rights.  Yet, these allowances for equality did 
not trump religious obligations, as evidenced by the fact that one 
legal opinion in the Talmud prohibited Jews from violating the 
Sabbath to assist in the birth of a Gentile child.37  Furthermore, the 
Talmud remained silent or vague as to the place of Gentiles in 
many areas of law.  Commentators throughout the Medieval and 
Modern Eras have since attempted to fill in these gaps. 
 
33 See MISHNA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 5:9 (stating that Jews can loan 
neighbors suspected of ―transgressing the Sabbatical Year‖ sieves and other 
farming tools during the sabbatical year, but may not ―winnow, or grind, or sift‖ 
with them; they can encourage Gentiles, but may not directly assist them in 
working the land).  
34 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE GITTIN 61a (commanding Jews to ―visit 
the Gentile sick along with the Jewish sick‖). 
35 Id.  See also TOSEFTA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 3:14 (requiring burial of Jew 
and Gentile alike). 
36 See MISHNA NASHIM, TRACTATE GITTIN 5:9 (encouraging Jews to offer 
greetings to Gentiles ―for the sake of peace‖). 
37 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE AVODAH ZARAH 26a (prohibiting 
Jewish midwifes from delivering the children of ―idolaters‖ on the Sabbath). 
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3.3. Medieval Jewish Law 
Since the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE, Jewish history has 
been saturated with persecution, death, and destruction.  With a 
population dispersed throughout Europe, Africa, and the Middle 
East, Jewish existence meant life as a discriminated minority.  The 
Middle Ages heightened this aspect of Jewish identity. 
The Crusades greatly affected Jewish identity and Jewish 
relations with Gentiles.38  The Mainz Anonymous, a particularly 
horrific document claiming to recount the eradication of the Jewish 
community in Mainz, Germany in 1096, reflects the intense 
xenophobia and venomous hatred of the Christian majority who 
murdered Jewish men and children, and raped and killed Jewish 
women.39  The intensity of this xenophobia led many Jews to 
commit suicide and to kill their own children rather than allow 
them to be kidnapped and converted to Christianity.40  Such acts—
which had, until then, been unequivocally condemned by Jewish 
law—found justification, or at a minimum, quiet acceptance, in 
Jewish law and in contemporary religious leaders.41  Medieval 
Jewish legalists chose to internalize these acts out of their 
communal need to honor the actions of the thousands who died at 
the hands of the crusaders and other persecutors.  The Middle 
Ages also witnessed countless burnings of sacred Jewish texts, 
expulsions from almost all of the countries in Western Europe, and 
 
38 See generally ROBERT CHAZAN, EUROPEAN JEWRY AND THE FIRST CRUSADE 
(1987) (outlining the effects of the First Crusade upon the Jewish population in 
Europe, with a particular emphasis on Jewish-Gentile relations during this 
period). 
39 See generally THE JEWS AND THE CRUSADERS: THE HEBREW CHRONICLES OF THE 
FIRST AND SECOND CRUSADES 95–116 (Shlomo Eidelberg ed., trans., KTAV Pub. 
House 1996) (offering a translation and detailed historical background of the 
Mainz Anonymous). 
40 Haym Soloveitchik, Religious Law and Change: The Medieval Ashkenazic 
Example, 12 ASS‘N FOR JEWISH STUD REV. 205, 208–09 (1987) (―Parents slaughtered 
their own children to prevent them from falling into Christian hands and being 
raised as Christians, and even recited a blessing on the murder of themselves and 
of their own children . . . .‖).  
41 Id. at 209–10.  One man in the Middle Ages sent a letter to Rabbi Maier of 
Rothenburg asking what penance he should perform after slaughtering his 
children in order to prevent them from ―falling into Christian hands.‖  Id.  
Reportedly, the Rabbi was hard put to find a reply.  Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/3
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the destruction of thriving Jewish communities across Europe.42  
As a minority thrust into this perilous situation for over 1000 years, 
Jewish society, and Jewish legal interpretation, consequently 
reflected an intensely xenophobic attitude. 
Medieval Jewish legal scholarship reached its height with the 
codification of Jewish law in the Shulhan Arukh.  While many 
interpretations of the ancient Jewish legal texts abounded during 
the Middle Ages—with legal scholars in each community and 
region prescribing proper Jewish practice—the Shulhan Arukh 
enjoyed widespread acceptance in the Jewish world after its 
printing in the 16th century.43  After its publication, a Jewish law 
scholar could not begin to study the contemporary practice of 
Jewish law without conferring with the near-authoritative Shulhan 
Arukh.  It stores the medieval consensus on Jewish law.44 
The Shulhan Arukh contains several subunits on laws relating to 
Gentiles.45  Consistent with one‘s expectations, given the place of 
Jews during the Middle Ages, the codified law limits the extension 
of human rights to Gentiles.  Thus, a Jewish woman may not nurse 
a Gentile child even for a wage.46  She may assist in the delivery of 
a Gentile child under extremely limited circumstances, and may do 
so only if the birth occurs during a weekday (not on the Sabbath or 
any of the festivals), she receives a wage, and she has a reputation 
 
42 See generally YITZHAK BAER, A HISTORY OF JEWS IN CHRISTIAN SPAIN (Jewish 
Publication Society 1978) (describing the Diaspora, development, and persecution 
of Jews in Spain from the eleventh century to the fifteenth century); JACOB RADER 
MARCUS, THE JEW IN THE MEDIEVAL WORLD (Hebrew Union College Press 1999) 
(chronicling Jewish persecution during the Middle Ages).  
43 See Joseph Davis, The Reception of the Shulhan ‗Arukh and the Formation of 
Ashkenazic Jewish Identity, 26 ASS‘N FOR JEWISH STUD. REV. 251, 252–53 (2002) 
(detailing the reaction to the groundbreaking legal codification in the Shulhan 
Arukh and its impact on Jewish identity).  
44 Many legal opinions from the Medieval period still carry weight in 
contemporary legal analysis.  Because they differ by region, common history, and 
surrounding majority population, it would take an entire paper to properly cover 
these opinions.  Instead I have opted to use the Shulhan Arukh as the legal 
consensus, and to incorporate specific medieval legalists and their opinions as 
they pertain to modern rabbinic legal arguments. 
45 Even though the Shulhan Arukh contains many laws directly and indirectly 
distrustful of Gentiles—and requiring strict separation from anything of religious 
significance to Gentiles—I will limit my overview to laws directly pertaining to 
human rights issues. 
46 See SHULHAN ARUKH, YOREH DEAH 154:2 (prohibiting a Jewish woman from 
nursing a Gentile child). 
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in the community as a midwife; she would most likely engender 
hostility if she refused to assist in the child‘s birth (apparently if 
she did not have a reputation as a midwife, she could claim 
ineptitude at midwifery and not engender animosity).47  
Furthermore, the codified law prohibits a doctor from healing 
Gentiles, except to avoid hostility, thus extending the prohibition 
against saving the life of a Gentile except to avoid hostility.48  
Similarly, the use of the principle for the ways of peace remained 
narrow; the Shulhan Arukh lists the examples stated in the ancient 
texts tersely and does not expand their scope.49  It also omits the 
command for Jews to give salutations to Gentiles.   
By the end of the Middle Ages, in light of the perennial societal 
hardships and catastrophes suffered at the hands of the popular 
majority, the Jewish law reflected a negative outlook on the rights 
that a Jew must afford universally. 
4. MODERN ISRAELI APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH 
LAW 
In 1948, Jewish history experienced an event with which it was 
wholly unfamiliar during the prior eighteen hundred years—the 
establishment of the State of Israel created a Jewish majority and 
Jewish sovereignty for the Jewish people.  Just as this event had 
many ramifications for Jews worldwide and Jewish identity, it also 
had great effects on Jewish law.  Jewish law‘s development 
throughout the previous centuries paid little attention, if any, to 
the laws and principles connected with sovereignty.  Statehood 
demanded that scholars breathe new life into these areas of Jewish 
law. 
The intersection between modern universal human rights 
values and the Jewish state is one of the areas that required 
reinterpretation.  Scholars within the Jewish legal system had to 
determine what Jewish law says about human rights for all human 
beings.  The Jewish people had suffered continual discrimination 
and destruction as a weak minority at the hands of a majority from 
whom they differed.  The hatred engendered by this history found 
its way into Jewish law over the ages.  However, majority status 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 158:1. 
49 Id. at 151:12, 235:9, 267:1. 
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and statehood placed Jewish law scholars at a crossroads; would 
they continue the theme of distrust and xenophobia towards the 
Gentile minority within their land, or, after centuries of 
experiencing minority status and persecution, would they decide 
to remedy those ills for the minority over whom the Israeli 
majority now had authority?  As evidenced by the following five 
legal opinions, rabbis contemporary with the State of Israel differ. 
4.1. Shelomoh Goren 
 Rabbi Shelomoh Goren discusses a Gentile‘s right to life in 
Jewish law.  According to Goren, the printed text of the Mishnah 
contains a substantive error.  As published currently, the Mishnah 
in Tractate Sanhedrin states, ―anyone who eradicates the life of a 
person from Israel, it is as if he has eradicated an entire world.‖50  
Given, however, that the early manuscripts omit the words ―from 
Israel,‖ Goren infers that this admonition applies to the taking of 
both Jewish and Gentile lives.51  He then quotes a Tanna, Ben Azai, 
whom Goren interprets to assert that Jewish law has the value of 
securing the lives of all human beings as one of its axiomatic 
pillars.52  In sum, all human beings have a right to a dignified life, 
because all human beings are created in the image of God.53 
Goren also discusses the property rights of Gentiles under 
Jewish law.  Whether or not Gentiles may possess property rights 
in a Jewish-controlled Israel turns mainly on the interpretation of 
Exodus 23:33.  The verse states, ―They shall not dwell in thy land—
lest they make thee sin against Me, for thou wilt serve their gods—
for they will be a snare unto thee.‖54  Maimonides, a medieval 
Jewish legal scholar, greatly expands the scope of this prohibition 
to include all Gentiles who have not received the status of resident 
alien, a status currently impossible to bestow.55  Thus, in essence, 
 
50 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN 37a. 
51 See 1 SHELOMOH GOREN, MESHIV MILHAMAH 3 (1983) (Isr.) (discussing the 
erroneous addition to the text of the Mishnah). 
52 See id. at 6 (finding the human rights value to life to be universal). 
53 See id. (alluding to the verse from Genesis 9:6). 
54 Exodus 23:33 (Jewish Publication Society), available at http://www.israel-
bar-mitzvah.com/torah/exo023.htm#001.  
55 See MOSHE BEN MAIMON, MISHNEH TORAH, HILCHOT AVODAT KOCHAVIM 10:6 
(declaring that no gentile is allowed onto Jewish lands unless ―he has accepted 
upon himself the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah,‖ in which case he is 
classed as a ―settling stranger,‖ who will only be accepted onto Jewish lands ―at a 
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Maimonides bans all Gentile settlement in a Jewish-controlled 
Israel.  However, Goren compiles the legal analysis of several other 
medieval legalists—primarily that of the Ra‘avad—which together 
produce a result more consistent with modern values.  The 
Ra‘avad asserts that the ban on Gentile settlement in Israel, but for 
bestowing resident alien status, only applies when a requisite legal 
body with the capacity to bestow such a status exists.  However, 
when that legal body does not exist, the ban on Gentile settlement 
only applies to a smaller segment of the Gentile population, i.e., 
outright idolaters.56  Goren concludes that because Gentiles today 
do not worship idols, they may not only possess property rights in 
Israel, but they may also enjoy other rights granted to Gentiles who 
‗lead orderly lives.‘57 
In his legal analysis of the internment of Gentiles, Goren is 
more circumspect.  Although he unmistakably asserts that the 
principle for the ways of peace demands that a Jew bury Gentile 
corpses, Goren equivocates about cemeteries containing both 
Jewish and Gentile corpses.58  The medieval consensus, Goren 
states, prohibited mixed cemeteries as an extension of the 
prohibition of burying a righteous person next to a villainous one.59  
Despite this, Goren manages to locate the lone legal opinion that 
permits mixed cemeteries, provided that the Gentile ‗led an orderly 
life.‘60  In the end, Goren rejects this lone opinion on formal legal 
grounds, but argues that it could be followed if a failure to do so 
would engender hostility.61 
Goren‘s liberal jurisprudence reflects the attempts of someone 
within the Jewish legal system to harmonize traditional Jewish 
 
time when the Jubilee is observed‖).  Conversely, converts to the Jewish faith were 
allowed complete access to Jewish lands under the Code of Maimonides.  Id. 
56 See SHELOMOH GOREN, MISHNAT HAMEDINAH 58 (1999) (Isr.) (limiting the 
limitation on the right to land to idolaters). 
57 Id. at 60–61.  The phrase ―lead orderly lives‖ refers to people who abide by 
the seven Noahide laws—a topic beyond the scope of this paper.  In brief, these 
laws encapsulate the bare minimum of an orderly society; the presence of a legal 
system that prohibits murder, theft, adultery, etc. 
58 See SHELOMOH GOREN, SEFER TORAT HAMEDINAH 289 (1996) (Isr.) (vacillating 
on whether Jews and Gentiles may be buried in the same cemetery). 
59 See id. at 290 (discussing the burial of Jews and Gentiles in the same 
cemetery). 
60 Id. at 294. 
61 See id. at 295 (incorporating the principle of engendering hostility into the 
discussion). 
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legal mandates with modern universal values.  According to 
Goren, the debate within formal Jewish law is not whether the 
basic human right to life applies universally or parochially; Jewish 
law does not allow the murder of any innocent human being.  
Instead, the law debates the gravity of murder as applied to 
different victims, Jews and Gentiles.  Goren argues for equal 
gravity in murdering a Gentile or a Jew by interpreting an 
authoritative source on the universal prohibition of murder.  Few 
legal scholars within the Jewish legal system accept source 
criticism of the Talmud as a valid form of legal analysis.  Goren‘s 
use of it here demonstrates his innovative jurisprudence not only 
in the harmonizing of Jewish law texts with modern universal 
values, but also in the utilization of modern academic historical 
analysis in positively ascertaining the original version of Jewish 
legal texts.  Additionally, his allusion to the Biblical verse that 
states that God created humanity in God‘s own image—a principle 
that few past Jewish legal scholars have employed—further 
demonstrates Goren‘s innovative jurisprudence.  By finding 
rationales in Jewish law to support a Gentile‘s right to life, 
property, and dignity after death, Goren generates the practical 
outcome of universal rights for Gentiles in Jewish law. 
4.2. Shaul Yisraeli 
Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli acknowledges the past deliberate 
separation made by Jewish law between Jews and Gentiles.  
However, he marks an important divergence from this segregation 
in the modern world.  In previous eras, Jewish law attempted to 
distance Jews from idolatry and anything reminiscent of it.62  In 
modern society—where idolatry has ceased to threaten the 
integrity of the Jewish religion—Jewish law now mandates a 
separation from Gentiles who reflect idolatry‘s detrimental 
characteristics.63  He underscores the importance, in his 
introduction to laws pertaining to Gentiles in Israel, that any 
suspicion of Gentiles is only legitimate insofar as the Gentile in 
question embodies those detrimental characteristics.  Any person, 
 
62 See SHAUL YISRAELI, SEFER ‗AMUD HAYEMINI 114–15 (1966) (Isr.) (detailing 
past Jewish law jurisprudence regarding Jews and Gentiles). 
63 Id. at 115.   
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Yisraeli insists, who ‗leads an orderly life‘ deserves dignity and 
respect.64 
Yisraeli also argues for property rights for Gentiles according 
to Jewish law.  In the ancient period when the land of Israel 
maintained a certain level of holiness, Gentiles could not own real 
property in Israel; but today, claims Yisraeli, because Israel lacks 
that same holiness, the prohibition against Gentile property rights 
has consequently dissipated.65  Elaborating further, Yisraeli quotes 
the same argument between Maimonides and the Ra‘avad as did 
Goren.66  While agreeing with Goren‘s result, he offers a different 
legal analysis.  According to Yisraeli, Maimonides‘s prohibition on 
allowing property rights in a Jewish-controlled Israel requires an 
extremely high threshold for what constitutes a ―Jewish-controlled 
Israel.‖  In order to consider Israel Jewish-controlled, Jewish 
sovereignty in Israel must encompass national security in the face 
of war, a majority of the worldwide Jewry settling in Israel, and 
control of all of the land within the borders of ancient Israel or the 
ability to exert control over all of ancient Israel.67  As these 
requirements have not been met, all people may enjoy property 
rights in the land of Israel. 
Yisraeli does, however, share Goren‘s liberal jurisprudence.  By 
shifting Jewish law‘s seeming contempt for Gentiles—all of whom 
presumably committed acts of idolatry—to a contempt for 
―idolatrous‖ actions, Yisraeli tries to expunge the animosity 
towards Gentiles from those within the Jewish legal system.  The 
laws remain the same, but the reality has changed.  Given this, 
Jews should not regard minorities in Israel with the same disdain 
as they have in the past—when the Jews themselves lived as the 
minority among an oppressive Gentile majority—because modern 
people have different characteristics.  According to Yisraeli, only 
those individuals who engage in idolatrous actions deserve 
contempt. 
Yisraeli uses this same method to argue in favor of Gentile 
property rights in Israel.  By requiring an extremely improbable 
factual test in order to trigger the law that would prohibit Gentile 
 
64 Id.  
65 See SHAUL YISRAELI, SEFER ERETS HEMDAH 208 (1958) (Isr.) (arguing that the 
prohibition remains intact for the produce that must be tithed, a nominal issue). 
66 YISRAELI, supra note 62, at 115. 
67 Id. at 122. 
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property rights, Yisraeli ensures Gentile property rights for the 
foreseeable future.  Yisraeli, like Goren, employs an innovative 
jurisprudence to provide legal conclusions that echo modern 
universal human rights. 
4.3. Aharon Lichtenstein 
Rabbi Dr. Aharon Lichtenstein begins his analysis of universal 
values in Jewish law by presenting the following thesis:  
―Whatever is demanded of [Jews] as part of [the assembly of Israel] 
does not negate what is demanded of [Jews] simply as human 
beings on a universal level, but rather comes in addition.‖68  As 
proof of this assertion, he cites the statement made by Issi ben 
Akiva in the Mekhilta, and interprets it as a challenge to the moral 
integrity of the Jewish legal tradition.69  Could it be, questions Isi, 
according to Lichtenstein, that a supposed superior moral code 
allows less moral behavior, i.e., the murdering of Gentiles?  The 
rabbi‘s response implicitly accepts Issi‘s challenge by agreeing with 
him.  Of course, Jewish law does not condone the murder of 
Gentiles or the violation of any other universal moral tenet.  
Nevertheless, Jewish courts do not have jurisdiction over such 
moral violations.  Lichtenstein, through his interpretation of the 
Mekhilta‘s recorded exchange, thereby asserts that Jews must 
abide by both sets of precepts, regardless of whether the 
imperative originates in universal human morality or in Jewish 
law.70 
 
68 AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, BY HIS LIGHT: CHARACTER AND VALUES IN THE 
SERVICE OF GOD 21 (2d ed. 2003). 
69 See id. at 23 (stating that Akiva challenges the moral integrity of the Jewish 
law tradition by questioning a verse in Mishpatim (Shemot 21:14)).  The verse 
seems to indicate that a Jew is punished for murder only if he kills a fellow Jew 
but not if the victim is a Gentile.  To Akiva, such verses are inconceivable, since 
they seem to indicate that crimes such as murder, ―which previously had been 
forbidden to general humanity would now be permitted to Jews by the Torah.‖  
Id. 
70 See id. 
[W]hatever is demanded of a person on a universal level is a priori 
demanded of a Jew as well; Torah morality is at least as exacting as 
general morality. . . .  Thus, part of what is demanded of a [Jew] is 
simply. . . what is demanded of every person as a human being. 
Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
WERMUTH.DOC 4/24/2011  9:53 AM 
1118 U. Pa. J. Int‟l L. [Vol. 32:4 
On the topic of the murder of Gentiles, Lichtenstein vigorously 
opposes any laxity.  The jurisdictional element does not affect 
practice because the imperative to follow moral and legal 
mandates does not depend on deterrence, but rather on the weight 
of the divine command.71  Thus, when he asserts that the 
prohibition against murder from the Decalogue applies to Gentiles 
who lead orderly lives, he concludes that no difference exists 
between the prohibitions against murdering a Jew and murdering 
a Gentile.72  He further states that someone who murders Gentiles 
in cold blood not only commits the serious crime of murder, but 
also desecrates the name of God—a critical prohibition in Jewish 
law.73 
Lichtenstein, in broad strokes, provides the most liberal 
jurisprudence in the area of human rights.  Jews must secure 
human rights for all people under Jewish authority.  The corpora of 
Jewish law remains silent on issues of universal human rights, 
because universal morality comprises a separate set of laws 
governing every human being, while Jewish law relates only to the 
laws governing Jews.  Therefore, Jews, by virtue of being human, 
must behave in accordance with universal human rights values as 
God commanded.  Although he does not provide an analysis of 
issues where universal human rights and Jewish law contradict 
one another, Lichtenstein‘s method presents the most inclusive 
jurisprudence on the intersection between Jewish law and 
universal human rights. 
4.4. Shlomo Aviner 
Conversely, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner does not present a clear 
picture of his view of Gentiles in Jewish law.  Aviner asserts a 
Biblical imperative to respect all human beings, yet he immediately 
thereafter differentiates between the respect due to all humans and 
 
71 See id. at 51 (―Chazal said, ‗Gadol ha-metzuveh ve-oseh,‘ thus placing at the 
center or even at the apex of our spiritual lives the sense of being called and 
commanded.‖). 
72 David Bar-Hayim, Goyim Behalachah [Gentiles in the Halakhah], 5, 
http://www.daatemet.org.il/articles/pdf/he_GentilesinHalacha.pdf.  
73 See 2 AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, LEAVES OF FAITH: THE WORLD OF JEWISH LIVING 
255 (2004) (incorporating the principle of Hillul Hashem into the discussion). 
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the extreme love required of all Jews towards all other Jews.74  
Aviner states that throughout the centuries of exile, Jews lacked the 
physical capabilities to avenge their fallen brethren.  But now, with 
a strong army, they should take revenge on the Gentiles who 
sought their destruction, striking fear in those who wish ill upon 
the Jews by taking the battle to their gates.75 
On the other hand, in the civilian context, he prohibits the 
murder of Gentiles on the basis of both Jewish law and universal 
principles of morality.76  The humanistic moral imperative to 
respect another‘s bodily integrity binds a Jew, just as it binds all 
others.77  He even quotes the Mekhilta, which interpreted the 
prohibition to murder given at Mount Sinai as proof that Jewish 
law creates an imperative that builds upon the humanistic moral 
imperative, not one that supplants humanistic obligations.78  
Aviner concludes from the discussion in the Mekhilta that a 
Biblical prohibition to murder Gentiles exists, over which the court 
of heaven has exclusive jurisdiction.79  He further states that 
anyone who murders a Gentile not only transgresses the Biblical 
prohibition of murder, but further damns himself by disgracing the 
name of God, a crime which can only be absolved by capital 
punishment.80   
 In the abstract, Aviner acknowledges a universal imperative 
from within Jewish law to relate to all human beings as humans 
without distinction by religion, race, sex, or status.81  However, in 
practice, Aviner does not explain which human rights this 
universal imperative demands, but does discriminate between the 
human value of Gentiles and the human value of Jews.82  In Jewish 
law, humans have rights because God created them in God‘s 
image.83  God created some humans more in his image than 
 
74 See SHLOMO AVINER, MASHIV HA-RUAH 32 (Gilad Helinger ed., 2006) (Isr.) 
(discussing the love and respect for human beings). 
75 Id. at 686. 
76 Id. at 687–88. 




81 See 4 SHLOMO AVINER, SHU‘T SHE‘EILAT SHLOMO 286 (2001) (acknowledging 
a universal human right to human dignity). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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others—these are Jews, according to Aviner.84  Thus, Jews receive 
additional human rights beyond those afforded to Gentiles.85  
Moreover, Gentiles as individuals unequivocally deserve property 
rights in Israel from legal and moral standpoints.86  However, 
Gentiles with whom a territorial conflict rages do not necessarily 
have these rights, according to Jewish law.87  Because of this, the 
Arab Gentile minority in Israel may stay in Israel only if they can 
be trusted to abide by Israeli law and remain loyal to the state.88  
Aviner determined that the current territorial conflict destroys the 
trustworthiness of the Arab Gentile minority at least in this 
manner.89  While in theory, the individual Arab Gentile deserves a 
peaceful coexistence with the Israeli majority, as long as the 
conflict continues, the protection of human rights for the Arab 
Gentile minority remains tenuous.90 
Aviner espouses quite hawkish ideas regarding the rights of 
dissidents and the Arab Gentile population in Israel.  He proclaims 
that according to Jewish law, the Israeli army has an obligation to 
engage in retaliatory actions and deterrence campaigns, as they see 
fit, to quash terrorist activity.91  In reference to minority dissidents 
who throw stones at Israeli citizens, Aviner assumes that they aim 
to inflict mortal wounds on their victims, unless the size of the rock 
or the distance between the attacker and victim precludes that 
possibility.92  Aviner believes that Jewish law courts may inflict 
excessive corporal punishments on people in order to deter others 
from acting in the same way.93  Thus, the rabbinic court should put 




85 See id. at 286–87 (asserting that additional human rights exist for Jews).  
Aviner does not list these rights or allude to their scope. 
86 Id. at 288. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 288–89.  
89 Id. at 289. 
90 Id. 
91 See SHLOMO AVINER, AL HA‘ARETZ LEVETAH: SHU‘T INTIFADA 17 (1993/1994) 
(discussing the permissibility of retaliatory military campaigns). 
92 Id. at 21. 
93 Id. at 22. 
94 Id. 
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Aviner continues to erode human rights protections of the lives 
of dissident minorities using the Jewish law doctrine of ―Pursuer,‖ 
or self-defense of a third party.  This doctrine requires any Jew 
who witnesses someone pursuing another person with murderous 
intentions to save the intended victim, even at the cost of the 
pursuer‘s life.95  Under this doctrine, Aviner asserts that any Jew 
who sees an aggressor lift a rock to throw at a Jewish victim, must 
protect the would-be victim, even if that would require killing the 
aggressor.96  This extreme portrayal of Jewish law doctrines does 
not turn on the severity of the law, but rather on the extreme 
finding of fact that all who throw stones do so with the intent to 
murder.  Once Aviner assumes this extreme fact—which 
undoubtedly reflects his political leanings—the application of 
normal legal principles, such as the self-defense of a third party, 
results in extreme conclusions. 
Aviner further assumes that ongoing terrorist activity against 
Israel puts Israel in a state of war with its aggressors.97  While he 
prohibits collective punishment as contrary to Jewish law, he limits 
that prohibition to times of peace.98  In war, Aviner asserts, Jewish 
law does not require differentiation between actual aggressors and 
civilians caught in the crossfire.99  Thus, citizens who harbor 
terrorists—a category that includes stone throwers—may suffer 
collective punishment, though such punishment should not match 
the severity of the punishments doled out to actual terrorists.100  
Aviner states that families and communities who do not hand over 
their terrorist relatives and friends to the Israeli authorities deserve 
to be punished as accomplices of terror.101  Furthermore, any 




97 Id. at 24.  
98 Id. at 23–24. 
99 Id. at 24.  This assertion concerning Jewish law has no support in any 
authoritative legal text.  Aviner instead backs up this claim with his own 
exegetical interpretation of one of the wars waged by King Saul recorded in the 
Bible.  This interpretation does not properly explain the text and, even if it did, 
would still require a logically invalid inference in order for this war to serve as 
proof of such an assertion. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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Israel appears to lose all rights afforded by the state, under 
Aviner‘s view of Jewish law.102 
Although Aviner appears to espouse some progressive human 
rights values, his extreme viewpoint on the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict hinders the practical implementation of human rights, 
according to his conception of Jewish law.  He fabricates his own 
hawkish Jewish law rules of war and applies them to the current 
conflict in Israel.  While he acknowledges a civilian value in 
incorporating universal human rights into Jewish law, he abrogates 
any concern for such rights during times of war or unrest. 
4.5. David Bar-Hayim 
Rabbi David Bar-Hayim espouses extreme views on Jewish law 
concerning human rights.  According to Bar-Hayim, a prohibition 
on murdering Gentiles (not punishable in a Jewish temporal court) 
exists in Jewish law without a clearly defined scope.103  While one 
medieval legalist, the Ra‘avan, posits that this prohibition emerges 
from the prohibition against murder in the Decalogue, the other 
medieval legalists quoted, Maimonides included, do not agree.104  
After alleging a non-existent consensus among medieval legalists 
concerning the prohibition of murder committed against Gentiles, 
Bar-Hayim concludes that a qualitative difference exists between 
the prohibited acts of murdering a Jew and a Gentile.105  The claim 
that the murder of either a Gentile or Jew carries the same 
weight—with the exception that Jewish courts are only granted 
jurisdiction over the murder of a Jew106—does not characterize 
Jewish law correctly, according to Bar-Hayim.  Under Bar-Hayim‘s 
view of Jewish law, the murder of a Jew qualitatively carries 
greater contempt than does the murder of a Gentile. 
Bar-Hayim also claims that Jewish law permits the kidnapping 
of Gentiles.  He quotes two Tannaitic sources, one that bans 
kidnapping without an express scope as to whom this ban applies 
and a second source that limits the ban on kidnapping to Jewish 
 
102 Id. at 75. 
103 See Bar-Hayim, supra note 72, at 8 (discussing the variety of opinions on 
the prohibition of murdering a Gentile).  
104 Id. at 9. 
105 Id. 
106 See supra at 117–18 (explaining Rabbi Lichtenstein‘s opinion that 
murdering a Gentile is as severe as murdering a Jew). 
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victims only.107  Bar-Hayim harmonizes the two texts by limiting 
the ban on kidnapping to Jewish victims, leaving no room for the 
possibility that the prohibition covers all human victims.108  To 
support this position, he uses Maimonides, whom he reads to 
allow the kidnapping of Gentiles.109  He offers a similar argument 
of silence to allow the injury of Gentiles.110 
Bar-Hayim underscores this grave distinction in the human 
rights of Jews and Gentiles with the outlandish exegetical claim 
that Jewish law equates Gentiles to animals rather than humans.111  
Except for the two cases where the legal sources force Bar-Hayim 
to recognize a Gentile‘s right to life and property, he rationalizes 
the disparity between Jews and Gentiles by likening Gentiles to 
animals.  Thus, humans typically feel hardly any compunction for 
kidnapping or injuring an animal, especially relative to the 
kidnapping and injuring of human beings.  Because they are 
considered animals under Bar-Hayim‘s extremist interpretation of 
Jewish law, Gentiles are not afforded the same legal protection as 
Jews.  Under this theory, they are not legally protected from 
kidnapping or intentional injury.  To bolster this claim, Bar-Hayim 
quotes several medieval and modern philosophical scholars who 
appear to agree with him.112 
His extremely antagonistic approach to human rights in Jewish 
law harnesses the animosity built up over the long period of Jewish 
persecution and unleashes it as fundamentalism for the modern 
era.  His jurisprudence solves any ambiguity in this context by 
limiting its scope to Jews only.  He then records the biased 
opinions of medieval and modern thinkers—themselves 
persecuted as members of a Jewish minority—and uses them as a 
 
107 See Bar-Hayim, supra note 72, at 16 (discussing the kidnapping of 
Gentiles). 
108 Id.  (discussing Bar-Hayim‘s failure to account for the possibility that these 
two sources reflect divergent legal opinions). 
109 Id.  His reading of Maimonides is inconclusive and, at worst, specious.  
Bar-Hayim argues from silence, claiming that because Maimonides did not 
mention Gentiles when he codified the laws of kidnapping, the kidnapping of 
Gentiles is therefore allowed.  Such an argument ignores the likely possibility that 
Maimonides‘s code of Jewish law contains gaps.  To fill one such gap in this 
manner reveals Bar-Hayim‘s a priori feelings towards ―the other.‖ 
110 Id. at 16–17. 
111 Id. at 23. 
112 Id. at 24–27. 
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backdrop for his intense hatred and apathy towards the humanity 
and the human rights of Gentiles. 
4.6. Interim Summary 
Following the establishment of the State of Israel, legalists 
internal to the Jewish law system have a choice to make in the 
context of human rights.  Jewish law had developed in the fifteen 
hundred years prior as a legal system for a dispersed minority 
among an oft-antagonistic Gentile majority.  The xenophobic 
hatred emerging as a result of Jewish persecution and countless 
massacres offers two divergent options for the modern legalist 
enjoying majority status under Israeli statehood.  Will Jewish law 
shed its xenophobia, learn from its people‘s horrible persecution, 
and ensure that any minority living under its authority enjoys the 
respect and safety that Jews so desperately wanted and never 
attained while a minority?  Or will Jewish law continue to foster 
the xenophobic attitude developed over centuries and unleash it on 
the minorities under its rule?  Some rabbis, such as Goren, Yisraeli, 
and Lichtenstein, have chosen the former path and highlight the 
tolerant themes in Jewish law while pragmatically interpreting 
other legal issues to accord with modern human rights values.  
Others, like Bar-Hayim, unequivocally choose the latter path and, 
garnering support from the bloodstained pages of Jewish history 
and its thinkers, fashion an extremely severe outlook on the human 
value afforded to Gentiles under Jewish law.  Yet, some, like 
Aviner, straddle the fence.  Although he occasionally reflects a 
tolerance aligned with the former attitude, this open-mindedness is 
often obscured by his hawkish nature.  At other times, he seems to 
subscribe to the latter approach while speaking of universal values 
to avoid being labeled an extremist.  These three approaches stated 
by these rabbis represent values in the Jewish population in Israel 
today.  Regardless of the demographics and whom the masses of 
religious Jews in Israel choose to follow, influential voices in 
Jewish law offer a progressive jurisprudence that supports human 
rights protections for Gentiles. 
5. THE APPROACH OF THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT 
The Modern Era has witnessed the expansion of both the 
acceptance and the scope of human rights throughout the Western 
world.  Today, legal discussions about whether certain people in 
society have a right to life or property seem rhetorical.  Western 
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secular courts punish all cold-blooded murderers regardless of 
whose life they take.  The legal discussions of human rights in 
contemporary Western court systems explore issues such as 
freedom of speech, religion, association, and the like.  The same is 
true of the Israeli legal system.  In a society fraught with political, 
religious, and military tensions, discussion of these freedoms 
requires the court‘s attention. 
A problem arises when trying to incorporate Jewish law as a 
source for Modern Israeli law.  The human rights values, sui generis 
to the Modern Era, do not have explicit sources in the corpora of 
Jewish law.  In fact, depending on whose interpretation one 
accepts, Jewish law can at times stand antithetical to modern 
human rights values.  This conundrum offers Israeli jurists the 
opportunity to reject the use of Jewish law in these areas or to find 
creative ways to base these modern freedoms on Jewish law 
principles otherwise not discussed or developed in previous 
centuries.  When choosing the latter option, the Israeli secular court 
jurists can interpret the law in ways barred to rabbinic Jewish law 
scholars save for a few mavericks.  Rabbinic Jewish law scholars 
maintain a strict doctrine of stare decisis, which bars subsequent 
legalists from overruling the decisions of past scholars.  The secular 
jurist does not have to abide by such a strict doctrine and is thus 
able to favor modern methods of legal interpretation. 
Justice Menachem Elon used this method of interpreting Jewish 
law in the human rights context in Neiman v. Chairman of the Central 
Elections Committee for the Eleventh Knesset.113  On the topic of 
freedom of thought and speech, Justice Elon offers several sources 
from Jewish law.  He writes: 
I believe there is no more penetrating and encompassing 
description of the freedom of expression and the 
importance of every individual opinion—even that of a 
single individual—than the Talmudic statement regarding 
the disputes between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai:  ―both 
are the words of the living God‖ (B.T. Eruvin 13b; J.T. 
Berakhot 1:4; J.T. Yevamot 1:6). . . .  [T]he halakha is according 
 
113 See generally EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Cent. Elections Comm. 
for the Eleventh Knesset 39(2) PD 225 (1985) (Isr.), translated in 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/84/020/000/Z01/84000020.z01.pdf 
(discussing human rights and cautioning against strict adherence to a common 
law doctrine, which might permit the spread of racism or hate).  
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to Bet Hillel . . . but the views of Bet Shammai remained 
legitimate and material in the world of the halakha.  This 
approach became characteristic of the halakha.114 
In the context of legal discussions, although one version became 
the law, the dissenting opinion remained an enduring voice in the 
Jewish legal system.  This plurality of voices that has survived in 
Jewish law throughout the ages ―has the power to create harmony 
and unity out of difference.‖115  The Jewish legal principle that 
―both are the words of the living God,‖ provides a basis for 
freedom of speech and thought.  Justice Elon concludes that the 
Jewish value in a plurality of voices, 
. . . is the lesson of leadership and government in the 
heritage of Israel—tolerance for every individual and every 
group, according to their opinions and outlooks.  And this 
is the great secret of tolerance and listening to the other, 
and the great potency of the right of every individual and 
every group to express their opinions, that they are not only 
essential to an orderly and enlightened regime but also vital 
to its creative power.116 
 The Israeli Supreme Court (hereinafter ―the Court‖) explained 
the universal right to human dignity and bodily integrity in Jewish 
law in Katlan v. Prisons Service.117  In his opinion, Deputy President 
Cohn locates the source for human dignity and bodily integrity in 
the statements of the Mishnah in Tractate Sanhedrin: 
The creation of humankind started with the creation of a 
single individual to teach that whoever removes one single 
soul from this world is regarded as if he had caused the 
whole world to perish; and whoever keeps one single soul 
alive in this world is regarded as having preserved the 
whole world.  And to preserve peace—that one person 
should not say to another:  ―my father is greater than your 
 
114 Neiman, 39(2) PD at 294, translated in id. at 76.  Halakha can be loosely 
translated as ―Jewish law.‖ 
115 Neiman, 39(2) PD at 295, translated in id. at 77. 
116 Neiman, 39(2) PD at 296, translated in id. at 78. 
117 See generally HCJ 355/79 Katlan v. Prisons Service 34(3) PD 294 [1985] 
(Isr.), translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., JEWISH LAW (MISHPAT IVRI): CASES AND 
MATERIALS 441–47 (1999) (discussing the right to human dignity and bodily 
integrity). 
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father.‖ . . . Therefore, every person must say:  ―The world 
was created for me.‖118 
Just as the world exists for the individual, it exists no less for any 
other individual, states DP. Cohn.119  This principle, asserts DP. 
Cohn, led Hillel the Elder to exclaim that all of Jewish law rests on 
the following principle:  do unto your friends as you would have 
done unto you.120  Therefore, states DP. Cohn, Jewish law prohibits 
the state from infringing on the bodily integrity and human dignity 
of anyone because such infringement constitutes humiliation and 
degradation to that person. 
Deputy President Cohn interprets Jewish law similarly to those 
internal to the Jewish law system.  However, while he reflects the 
interpretation of Rabbi Goren on the universality intended by the 
statements in the Mishnah from Tractate Sanhedrin, he surpasses 
scholars internal to Jewish law in his universal reading of Hillel‘s 
statements.  As demonstrated earlier, rabbinic and traditional 
exegeses of Jewish law interpret references to ―friends‖ locally as 
referring only to Jews.  DP. Cohn, however, extends the reference 
to ―your friends‖ in Hillel‘s statement to all human beings. 
Furthermore, DP. Cohn develops a rule for human dignity, 
ensuring that no action ―causes a person to be disgraced or 
embarrassed‖ from studying the case law found in the Talmud.121  
In the religious Jewish law tradition, scholars have never 
developed a rule for human dignity, which they could apply to 
other areas of law beyond the specific examples in the Talmud.  
Traditionally, this principle remained confined to Talmudic 
applications.  The Court breaches this traditional approach by 
applying the principle of human dignity beyond its traditional 
confines. 
 
118 MISHNAH, NEZIKIN, TRACTATE SANHEDRIN 4:5. 
119 Katlan, 34(3) PD at 11, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 117, 
at 444. 
120 Id.; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE SHABBAT 31a (citing the 
original statement of Hillel the Elder). 
121 Katlan, 34(3) PD at 12, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 117, 
at 445. 
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In State of Israel v. Guetta,122 Deputy President Elon continues 
the discussion of human dignity in Jewish law.  The value assigned 
to human dignity in Jewish law protects against ―the humiliation 
or demeaning of the image of God in man.‖123  Jewish law places a 
premium on the value of human dignity, explains DP. Elon, to the 
extent that human dignity considerations trump rabbinic 
legislation124 and, according to one source, even supersede Biblical 
law.125  The Talmud offers the following example to elucidate this 
legal hierarchy.  The Biblical ban on wearing wool and linen 
interwoven in the same garment is expanded in terms of both 
potency and applicability in rabbinic legislation.126  If, however, the 
rabbinic expansion of this ban conflicts with human dignity, 
human dignity preempts the ban.127  This conflict might occur 
when someone realizes that he is in fact wearing such prohibited 
clothing while in public.  In such a case, he need not remove his 
clothing immediately.  Instead he may wait until he returns home 
to remove the banned clothing.  Thus, states DP. Elon, this 
principle prevents the state from conducting humiliating public 
searches of any person, especially those requiring the person to 
undress.128 
DP. Elon greatly expands the scope of this legal discussion.  
While rabbinic legal analysis limits the pertinence of this law to 
Jews alone, the Court applies this law to all scenarios where 
human dignity conflicts with law, especially to required public 
 
122 See generally CrimA 2145/92 State of Israel v. Guetta 46(5) PD 704 [1992] 
(Isr.), translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 117, at 449–53 (discussing the 
permissibility of body searches in public). 
123 Guetta, 46(5) PD at 724, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 
117, at 452. 
124 Guetta, 46(5) PD at 724, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 
117, at 451; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE BERAKHOT 19b (citing the 
original discussion of human dignity).  
125 Guetta, 46(5) PD at 724, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 
117, at 451.  See PALESTINIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE KILAYIM 40b (allowing human 
dignity concerns to override Biblical law). 
126 Guetta, 46(5) PD at 717–18, translated in MENACHEM ELON ET AL., supra note 
117, at 451; see BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE BERAKHOT 19b (citing the original 
discussion of human dignity in the context of wearing clothing made of wool and 
linen). 
127 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 124 (overruling the ban on interwoven 
garments because of human dignity concerns).  
128 Id. 
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undress.  The Court also reads the value of human dignity 
universally, finding it to apply to all human beings, not just Jews. 
The Court‘s tendency to interpret Jewish law universally 
extended to the bioethical considerations on euthanasia in Shefer v. 
State of Israel.129  In the context of passive euthanasia—withholding 
life-sustaining treatment—the Court discusses the Jewish law 
prohibition on withholding life-sustaining action as interpreted 
from Leviticus 19:16, ―[y]ou shall not stand by the blood of your 
fellow.‖130  From this and several other Jewish law sources, the 
Court bans certain acts of euthanasia for all people.131 
By extending this ban, this analysis not only neglects the 
traditional interpretation of ―your fellow‖ in Jewish law, but it 
bypasses the traditional approach to saving the life of Gentiles as 
recorded in the Talmud.132  Jewish law states that this verse does 
not apply to Gentiles.133  Furthermore, a Jew may only save the life 
of a dying Gentile if to do otherwise would engender hostility from 
the rest of the Gentile population.134  The analysis of the Court 
expands the understanding of this verse in Jewish law to include 
all human beings, while ignoring an explicitly contradictory 
passage from the Talmud.135 
In Dwaikat et al. v. State of Israel et al., the Court adjudicated a 
dispute over land privately owned by Arab Gentile residents on 
which a group of Israelis intended to establish a civilian 
settlement.136  In this context, the Court unequivocally rejects the 
 
129 See CA 506/88 Shefer v. State of Israel 48(1) PD 87, 132 [1993] (Isr.), 
translated in http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/88/060/005/z01/88005060 
.z01.pdf (discussing the permissibility of euthanasia). 
130 Shefer, 48(1) PD at 108, translated in id. at 23.  The opinion mistakenly states 
that the source for the quoted verse is Leviticus 19:9.  It is in fact Leviticus 19:16 as 
recorded above. 
131 Shefer, 48(1) PD at 194, translated in id. at 140. 
132 BABYLONIAN TALMUD, TRACTATE AVODAH ZARAH 26a. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 This does not mean that the court has chosen to ignore this passage from 
the Talmud.  There is room for the court to interpret the passage from Tractate 
Sanhedrin differently, for instance, as applying only to idolatrous Gentiles.  Such 
an interpretation would maintain the integrity of Jewish law texts and allow the 
Court to validly explain the Biblical verse, Leviticus 19:16, as it did. 
136 See generally HCJ 390/79 Dwaikat v. State of Israel 34(1) PD 1 [1980], 
translated in ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 6, at 379 (adjudicating a dispute over 
Arab-owned land).   
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notion that Jewish law allows Jews to deprive Gentiles of their 
property in the State of Israel.137  As proof, the Court cites Leviticus 
19:34, which demands equal treatment for the other who dwells in 
the land of Israel.138  Unlike those internal to Jewish law who offer 
apologetic rationales for affording property rights to Gentiles, the 
Court finds positive affirmation from Jewish law, by overlooking 
the legal formalities required for resident alien status, to support 
universal human rights. 
The Court discusses Jewish law‘s attitude towards minorities 
under a Jewish government in Neiman.139  The Court, citing 
Deuteronomy 23:8 (―you shall not abhor an Egyptian, for you were 
a stranger in his land‖)140 asserts that Jewish law rejects racism.141  
Despite Jewish enslavement by Egyptians for hundreds of years, 
Jews may not hate the entire Egyptian nation for its past injustices.  
Furthermore, any foreigner who chooses to live under Jewish 
sovereignty must enjoy equal protection of laws, as the Bible states 
in Numbers 9:14:  ―[t]here shall be one law for you, whether 
stranger or citizen of the country.‖142  After citing Biblical 
protections for minorities, the Court discusses the many 
protections afforded to resident aliens by Jewish law.143  The Court 
lists several of these protections and applies this entire legal 
analysis to any minority living in Israel today without mentioning 
the discussion among Jewish law scholars of the modern inability 
to bestow resident alien status according to Jewish law. 
In Berger v. Haifa District Planning and Building Committee, the 
Court elaborates on the Jewish law requirement of equal protection 
 
137 Dwaikat, 34(1) PD at 11, translated in ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 6, at 383. 
138 Id.  See Leviticus 19:34 (Jewish Publication Society of America) (―The 
stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall 
love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I the Lord am 
your God.‖).  
139 See EA 2/84 Neiman v. of the Cen. Elections Comm. for the Eleventh 
Knesset 39(2) IsrSC 225, 300 [1985], translated in 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/84/020/000/Z01/84000020.z01.pdf 
(discussing human rights).  
140 Deuteronomy 23:8 (Jewish Publication Society of America).  
141 Neiman, 39(2) IsrSC at 300, translated in http://elyon1.court.gov.il 
/files_eng/84/020/000/Z01/84000020.z01.pdf at 85. 
142 Numbers 9:14 (Jewish Publication Society of America). 
143 Neiman, 39(2) IsrSC at 301, translated in http://elyon1.court.gov.il 
/files_eng/84/020/000/Z01/84000020.z01.pdf at 86. 
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to minorities under Jewish rule.144  After quoting several verses 
establishing the requirement of due process and equal protection 
for minorities,145 the Court offers a thematic survey of Jewish 
history.  When Jews lived as nearly helpless, dispersed minorities 
among Gentile majorities, they suffered ceaseless, bitter 
persecution and perennial massacres simply because their religious 
faith differed from that of the surrounding majority.146  Thus, after 
the Jews established their own sovereignty and consequent 
majority, it behooves them to ensure the safety and equality of 
minorities under their authority even more vigilantly than a new 
State whose people have no experience with persecution as a 
minority.  In addition, the Jewish law precept to treat all people 
equally because God created all humans in the image of God 
bolsters such an attitude.147  Here, the Court explicitly embraces the 
lesson from Jewish history it has chosen.  Like many legalists 
internal to the Jewish law system, the Court aims to protect the 
rights of minorities living under Jewish sovereignty precisely 
because the Court understands the devastation inherent in the 
persecution of minorities.  To ensure that Jewish law and Jewish 
heritage reflect this lesson, the Court extended Jewish law to areas 
barred to those scholars internal to the Jewish legal system. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The modern jurisprudence of many Israeli rabbis and the 
Supreme Court of Israel demonstrate that Jewish law can be 
interpreted consistently with modern human rights values.  After 
Israel gained statehood, Jewish thinkers began fashioning a 
jurisprudence that interpreted Jewish law in ways affording 
Gentiles more protections and rights while under Jewish authority 
in Israel.  As they functioned within the Jewish law tradition, 
previous generations had cemented authoritative interpretations 
 
144 See generally HCJ 392/72 Berger v. Haifa District Planning and Building 
Committee 27(2) IsrSC 764 [1973] (discussing the requirement of equal protection 
to minorities). 
145 See id. at 771; Exodus 12:49, Leviticus 24:22, Deuteronomy 1:16 (stating the 
demand for equal protection and due process for minorities). 
146 Berger, 27(2) IsrSC at 771. 
147 Id.  See generally Menachem Elon, The „Other‟ in Jewish Law and in the 
Decisions of the Supreme Court, 42 MADA‘EI HAYAHADUT 31 (2004) (Isr.) (elaborating 
on the discussion of Gentiles in Jewish law and the differences in approach 
between Supreme Court justices). 
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that barred a full integration of the rights of Jews and Gentiles.  
Nevertheless, they found creative ways to apply certain laws and 
explain away other laws to ensure that Gentiles received certain 
protections in Israel.  However, while the rabbis have certain limits 
on interpretation, the Court does not.  It reads Jewish law through 
a universal lens, deviating from traditional bars on interpretation 
and rigorous adherence to legal formalities.  By doing so, it extends 
the traditional protections afforded to Jews and resident aliens to 
all people within the authority of the Israeli government.  The 
Court and many Israeli rabbis manifest the belief that because of 
past Jewish persecution, Jews and Israel should specifically protect 
and ensure the rights of any minority within its authority. 
Some Israeli rabbis espouse more radical ideas reminiscent of 
the xenophobia engendered throughout the Diaspora.148  While 
those rabbis have followers in the Israeli population,149 so too do 
the many other rabbis who preach tolerance and respect.150  Jewish 
law in the hands of modern Israeli rabbis and jurists has moved 
and continues to move towards the modern, tolerant, and 
universal approach to human rights.  The issue of whether the 
Jewish nature of Israel conflicts with the goals of a democratic state 
can be debated.  But human rights values in Jewish law as 
interpreted by the Israel Supreme Court and many rabbis do not 
pose any threat to democratic values in Israel. 
 
148 See generally Yitzchak Blau, Ploughshares Into Swords: Contemporary 
Religious Zionists and Moral Constraints, 34:4 TRADITION 39 (2000) (presenting an 
overview of belligerent attitudes espoused by several modern Israeli rabbis). 
149 See Ethan Bronner, Israelis Arrest West Bank Settler in Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 2009, at A9 (providing an example of Israeli followers of radical rabbis). 
150 See Rebecca Huberman, Bein Dam Le‟Dam, 33 AMUDIM 352 (1985) (Isr.) 
(arguing for a Biblical ban on murder that applies universally). 
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